Is Britain ready for the age of drone warfare?

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‘The Bomber Will Always Get Through.’ With this blunt warning in 1932, eight years before the Blitz, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin revealed a harsh truth: nothing was safe in the era of aerial warfare. Almost a century later, we are faced with an equally formidable threat in the form of cheap and scalable drones. This points to a clear priority: counter-drone technology should sit at the very top of Britain’s defence research, development, and procurement priorities.

Iran’s drone campaign across the Gulf has demonstrated how inexpensive drones can be used to disrupt major economic centres. Images of Shahed drones striking Palm Jumeirah and Saudi oil facilities have underscored the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Within days — if not hours — Iran was able to shake the UAE’s reputation as a secure financial hub and disrupt significant portions of Saudi and Qatari oil production. Shortly thereafter, drones targeted a British base in Cyprus and multiple American bases across the region. 

Iran is not relying on drones alone, but is also deploying conventional weapons, such as ballistic missiles, which can and do threaten UK assets, as the recent attempted strike on Diego Garcia has demonstrated. Nevertheless, these are familiar threats, long accounted for in defence doctrine. Drones, by contrast, are disrupting established systems and leaving both our cities and militaries newly exposed.

This is not the first time we have witnessed the transformational impact of drones on modern warfare. Almost from the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides have used them extensively, in doing so clearly demonstrating the unparalleled reach of drone technology. 

For the last two winters, Russia has been waging an inhumane campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, targeting heating and water infrastructure in particular. As a result, Ukraine was forced to ration electricity and rely on portable generators to keep the lights and heating on through the winter. In January 2026, Russia launched around 140 Shahed-type drones per day, with the total number of UAVs rising to 450 on February 3 during the largest attack of this winter.

While I am not claiming that the UK is on the precipice of war with Russia, it is clear that Britain, and London in particular, is very much within the range of Russian Shahed drones. Shahed drones have a maximum flight range of around 1,550 miles, meaning that a drone launched from Moscow might struggle to reach London. However, drones launched from its Baltic Sea enclave of Kaliningrad, its ally, Belarus, or even from a Russian ship would have no difficulty reaching British targets.

Of course, reaching the UK would require drones to fly over much of Europe, but the sheer number of drones Russia launches daily suggests that at least a few could make it this far. Besides, if the war in Ukraine were to stop, Russia’s ability to produce and stockpile thousands upon thousands would rapidly make itself apparent. Even if every single drone could be intercepted with traditional air defence, the economics remain untenable: stopping a $50,000 drone with a missile costing up to $5 million would either force defences to let some through or impose crippling costs. 

It is also worth noting that the Russo-Ukrainian war has demonstrated that drones are not only revolutionising aerial warfare, but naval warfare as well. So far, Ukrainian naval drones have successfully hit and destroyed Russian oil tankers, military ships, and even submarines both at sea and in port. However, these systems have not yet been used over distances large enough to pose an immediate threat to the UK on the same scale as aerial drones, and instead are confined to the Baltic Sea. That said, it remains plausible that Russia could deploy such drones from their ships that already operate in close proximity to the British Isles.

However, long-distance drones are not the only major threat to the UK. Ukraine’s deployment of small, low-cost FPV drones illustrates how one can launch attacks from within enemy-controlled areas. The most brazen and impressive example was the 2025 ‘Operation Spiderweb’, which saw Ukrainians smuggle in trucks full of drones deep into Russia. Once they reached their target areas, remotely operated drones were used to strike high-value military assets, such as strategic bombers, with an estimated combined value of $7 billion.

Only a few such drones would need to be smuggled into the UK to potentially damage or destroy military or civilian infrastructure. What is more, their small scale and low cost also mean that terrorist groups could use these drones. This is perhaps the hardest reality to reckon with. A threat from a Shahed is not fundamentally different, psychologically, from that of a missile or a bomb; however, the idea that a terrorist might not need to hide an explosive or deliver it personally, but could instead fly it in remotely, is far more concerning. 

The answer to this threat is clear: the UK must develop and deploy an effective, affordable and scalable counter-drone defence. Indeed, some researchers argue that this should be the top priority for the Government, even above investment in offensive drone capabilities.

It is likely that at some point we shall once again develop a defence that will effectively counter the drone threat, ideally before Britain finds itself in conflict with Russia or any other state possessing significant drone capabilities. Until we do so, we must remember that ‘the drone will always get through’.

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