Britain’s defence kit has a China problem

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There is a long-standing maxim in broadcasting: always assume the mic is hot. In other words, if you are within range of a microphone, work on the basis that you are being recorded and exercise the appropriate level of discretion and confidentiality. Over the past 10 or 15 years, it has become clear that this should be adapted to the world of communications technology. As its industry becomes ever more sophisticated and enmeshed with a global market, always remember: when it comes to Chinese-made components, assume they are recording.

The Ministry of Defence has fallen foul of this precautionary principle. The Royal Marines have been forced to suspend their use of K3 Scout autonomous vehicles made by Kraken Technologies, a subsidiary of Octopus Energy, after discovering that the platforms used third-party cameras, components of which were transmitting ‘heartbeat communications’ to an IP address in China.

Predictably, the MoD is playing down the significance of this. It stated that it takes the ‘security of our equipment, networks and data extremely seriously’ – something you might hope we could take as read – and insists that there is no evidence of any sensitive data being transmitted abroad. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will have to take the department at its word, but that is not the matter closed and forgotten about.

One basic point, to parse the MoD’s public statement, is that it is impossible definitively to say now what is and is not ‘sensitive’ data. The ‘heartbeat communications’ the drone component was transmitting are designed to show that the system is online and functioning properly; it is a kind of proof of life for autonomous systems. That, in isolation, may not be ‘sensitive’, but it is easy to see how it could be contextualised to reveal to an adversary information about the deployment and activity of Royal Marines units using the K3 Scout.

That in itself is worrying. The drones are capable of use not only by the regular Royal Marines Commando Force but also by the Special Boat Service (SBS), the Royal Navy’s special forces and counter-terrorism unit based at RM Poole in Dorset. Like all special forces units, the SBS is hyper-vigilant about operational security, and even this small issue will cause anxiety. One anonymous source told The Daily Telegraph, ‘This is a major failure to check origins of components and we have lost confidence in the platform.’

Clearly, there has been some kind of failure; either the Ministry of Defence did not know that the K3 Scout’s cameras used Chinese-made components, or it was aware but insufficiently curious about or concerned by that fact. It is noticeable that the department’s public statement, issuing reassurance that no ’sensitive’ data had been transmitted, did not indicate that the department or the Royal Navy had previous knowledge or had undertaken risk mitigation in advance.

This episode also demonstrates how internationalised the defence supply chain is in the 21st century. This is even more true for smaller manufacturers like Kraken which will inevitably be forced to rely on some third-party components. Except for the most secret and highly classified of platforms like the current Vanguard-class and forthcoming Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines, there is no such thing as ‘buying British’ in absolute terms. The defence industry relies on a global supply chain with attendant vulnerabilities.

This means the government needs to check, check and check again when it comes to the acquisition of equipment and platforms for covert and secret use. But it has a specific significance in terms of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ever since they took office in July 2024, Labour have had an unrealistic and muddled attitude towards China, believing they can exploit Beijing and benefit economically from a closer relationship with the PRC while maintaining their moral finger-wagging in public forums.

Lammy, who was Foreign Secretary from July 2024 to September 2025, had promised an ‘audit’ of the UK’s relationship with China in order to clarify and explain the situation. This was a miserable failure: late to commence, the audit did not conclude until June 2025, almost a year after Labour came to office. When it did, it remained unpublished because of the ‘high classification’ of much of its content, and we were left simply with a statement to the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary, containing ‘a broad summary of its recommendations’.

Predictably, the ‘China audit’ avoided any hard decisions. Instead it perpetuated the witless formula that ‘we will cooperate where we can and we will challenge where we must’, as if those two propositions will always be compatible.

What we should have learned, if we had not from the fiasco of Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s 5G network during Theresa May’s premiership, is that we cannot trust China. We know the Chinese are actively involved in espionage against us, and therefore represent a security risk. This is a wider issue of diplomacy, but when it comes to the nuts and bolts of small mechanical and technological components, we must be rigorous and exacting in screening products to verify their true origins, and we may have to conclude that any Chinese-manufactured components are too high a risk. The MoD will need to be more careful.

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