What should, could and will Cameron get from his EU renegotiation?



With a Conservative majority and all the Labour leadership candidates saying they support a referendum on our EU membership, it now seems certain we shall have one in either 2017 or 2016. The options will be to either leave or stay on the terms secured in a renegotiation, which is apparently to be completed by this autumn. David Cameron is due to brief his EU partners on what he wants from that renegotiation this Friday.
What should he be after, what is he after, and what will he get?
First, the shoulds. Here’s what I would regard as pretty much a minimum list.
I could spend (I have, over the years, spent!) article after article explaining why each of these points is vital. But since this isn’t David Cameron’s list, let’s instead focus upon that. Here’s what he is reported as asking for.
You’ll notice that two of these renegotiation objectives match those I set out – the ever closer union one and the Eurozone vs non-Eurozone one. Two of them aren’t on my list (mainly because they are (a) A Bad Idea; and (b) incompatible with the concept of the EU). And several of those on my list aren’t on his. This last point may be a bit less important than it seems in that if we secured the ones on Cameron’s list we’d probably get most of the other ones that I indicated fairly automatically, almost by way of footnotes. But even that would still leave some pretty significant gap between my position and his.
What will he get? I think there’s a good chance that he will get a stripped down (and largely – and mercifully – cosmetic) version of the benefits one. The UK does not currently take advantage of all the scope even the current EU rules offer to restrict benefits for migrants (partly for wonkish reasons to do with the way our benefits system works). We could get something cosmetic, giving our policymakers the excuse to change our rules in way that take fuller advantage of the EU’s rules.
I note that, as should be obvious to anyone that knows the first thing about the EU, there is precisely zero possibility that any of these benefit rules changes will constitute any restriction whatever upon the Free Movement of Persons, which is as fundamental an aspect of the Single Market as there not being tariffs on imports, despite Cameron’s daft repeated assertions that he will renegotiate this (which he even re-stated, in terms, in the televised Leaders’ Debate). But, hey!
I think he will get the exemption from ever closer union. I also think there’s a pretty good chance he can get some additional protections for non-Eurozone EU members from being over-ruled by the Eurozone. There is already a new voting system that operates at the European Banking Authority called “double majority” voting, whereby for certain EU banking rules to change there has to be a majority (in the relevant technical sense) of both the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone. The rest of the EU could agree to that being extended to other policy areas.
It’s of interest to understand why they might agree. Because although this seems like a huge change to the EU’s rules, it would actually be much less significant than it first appears. The reason is that the European Banking Authority rules already contain in the small print a provision that once the number of non-Eurozone members falls below five, the double majority system lapses and there has to be something new. That same bit of small print for Cameron’s renegotiation would do nicely, because the number of non-Eurozone EU members is due to fall below five by around 2020. It would basically be an agreement to give the non-Eurozone EU a collective veto on new rules for about three or four years. If that helps Cameron, I suspect our EU partners will shrug and say “OK.”
A protection like double majority voting is essential if the non-Eurozone EU is to be viable over the longer term – and I don’t mean just for the UK – the same problem will apply to Demark, Sweden and Bulgaria as well (the other three likely long-term non-euro EU members). But it won’t be enough by itself unless the non-Eurozone EU can be big enough, relative to the Eurozone, to be viable. The soon-to-be 24 members of the Eurozone can’t be expected to allow four non-Eurozone members to have a long-term veto over all rule changes.
Anyway, Cameron might get this, and it could easily look like a really big deal (even to our negotiators) until one examines the small print carefully.
Lastly there’s the proposal to allow national parliaments to block laws. It’s certainly true that this is a negotiating point on which Cameron will have allies in many other Member States. But it is very unlikely to go through in any substantive way. Perhaps there will be something cosmetic, but the EU’s legislative procedures are already arcane and convoluted enough without having even more layers of complexity. It’s a daft idea, frankly. The whole point of the EU is that collective decisions should be able to over-rule decisions of individual parliaments. That can’t really change in any important way.
So I think he can get somewhere with the renegotiation points he raises. And I don’t think one should regard his list as unambitious. It is ambitious and probably won’t all be achieved. But in the end, two basic questions will remain:
I believe we should not by any means rule out the possibility that Cameron and Osborne conclude, given what they get from the renegotiation and given the mood within the Conservative Party and the country, that their best strategy is to come back with a deal and recommend we say No and vote to leave the EU. That’s not certain – I don’t think even they necessarily yet know what they’ll do. But don’t rule it out yet.