A strange thing happened in the Baltic Sea last month. In the early hours of Monday November 18, the undersea telecommunications cable linking Finland and Germany was cut. This occurred just a day after another cable, this time linking Lithuania and Sweden, was also damaged, reducing Lithuania’s internet capacity by a fifth. What caused this damage is not definitively known, but a number of security officials have suggested that this might have been deliberate sabotage by a Chinese flagged ship leaving a Russian harbour.
This is not the first time such a situation has occurred. In October 2022 the residents of the Shetland Islands found that their phone network and internet suddenly stopped working, after the undersea cable linking them to the mainland was damaged. The police declared it to be a major incident, and additional officers from across Scotland had to be drafted in to assist with the response. Full service was restored the following day, but there is still uncertainty about what caused the damage, and whether it was deliberate. While the BBC reported that this was accidental damage by a trawler, others point to the presence of a Russian ‘vessel of interest’ in the vicinity as evidence that this was no accident, and that it could have been a trial run for a bigger attack.
The UK is hugely reliant on a network of undersea pipes and cables to keep us connected to the rest of the world. According to a House of Commons library paper, 99% of global internet traffic goes through undersea cables, while 77% of gas imports to the UK come through pipes from Norway. Our reliance on this undersea infrastructure is only likely to grow. Offshore wind farms accounted for 17% of the UK’s electricity production in 2023, and this will dramatically increase over the coming years as more are built. These offshore wind farms are all supported by a vast network of undersea electric cables to bring the power generated back onshore.
Attacking this network of cables and pipes is likely to be an appealing target to a hostile state like Russia. Technological constraints make it very hard to monitor what is going on underwater, which is the main reason why the UK and France use submarines for their nuclear deterrent. The flip side of this is that it makes it very hard to know who has attacked your undersea cables or pipelines. This makes retaliation difficult – you can only hit back when you know who it was who hit you first. A good example of this is the Nord Stream pipeline, which was sabotaged in late 2022. Almost two years on, there is still disagreement among many political leaders as to which country was responsible for the attack, with both Russia and Ukraine being blamed.
Sabotaging undersea infrastructure is also likely to cause a huge amount of disruption and economic damage, but very few direct casualties. This makes it hard for the UK to respond in a proportional way. Sinking a Russian naval vessel in retaliation would involve a significant loss of life and lead to a serious escalation, if not all out war. It would also allow Russia to portray the UK as the aggressor. These two factors combined make this exactly the kind of ‘grey zone’ activity which Russia has specialised in over the last decade. Of particular concern at the moment is that Russia may look to punish the UK for allowing Ukraine to use long range missiles to strike inside Russia.
Fears have been heightened in recent years as a number of Russian military vessels have been observed acting suspiciously in the waters above where undersea cables are located. Despite the lacklustre performance of its military in Ukraine, the Russian navy still retains substantial deep sea capability. At the forefront of this is the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research or GUGI, which despite its innocent sounding name, is actually a highly secretive branch of the Russian Navy specialising in deep sea operations. In particular, they operate a number of titanium-hulled submarines which are able to operate at depths which would crush other submarines, and which are equipped with robotic arms to allow them to attack cables or plant explosive devices.
These concerns are exacerbated by the current woeful state of the Royal Navy, and especially the submarine fleet. A Daily Mail front page from earlier this year highlighted the fact that, at the time, not a single one of the UK’s six attack submarines was currently at sea, with three of the vessels each having been in port for more than a year. This is not the first time this has happened – the website Navy Lookout reported that the same had also occurred last year as well. If defence journalists are aware of this, then our enemies certainly are as well.
The Ministry of Defence is clearly concerned by this vulnerability and has tried to take steps to address it. Last year, it acquired a new ship, RFA Proteus, with the plan that it would undertake undersea surveillance operations. Despite acquiring the ship in January 2023, as of the end of August this year she had yet to complete any active patrols. Although she has made several highly publicised visits to London, RFA Proteus has spent much of the time since being acquired in harbour undergoing modifications. It has been reported that, as with so much of the Royal Navy, she has been impacted by crew shortages and issues with getting modifications done on time.
The new Labour Government needs to address this threat, and quickly. While three of our attack submarines are now back out on patrol, a concerted effort needs to be made to keep our submarines operational. Every effort should also be made to get RFA Proteus fully operational as quickly as possible as well. There is also an urgent need for more investment in existing programmes, such as those to develop unmanned underwater vehicles for routine surveillance work.
Arguing for more to be spent on defence at a time when government spending is being cut elsewhere is always going to be challenging, but investing now will likely save much more down the line. While many pensioners are worried about the impact of losing their winter fuel allowance, if Russia chooses to sabotage our undersea and gas and electricity infrastructure, the whole country could be facing a very cold winter.
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