In a video-call address to a summit being held in Kyiv on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a further package of UK assistance to Ukraine accompanied by additional sanctions. He said the aim was to increase pressure on Vladimir Putin to make concessions in peace talks, declaring:
Russia does not hold all of the cards in this war because the Ukrainians have the courage to defend their country, because Russia’s economy is in trouble and because they have now lost the best of their land forces and their Black Sea fleet in this pointless invasion. So we must increase the pressure even further to deliver an enduring peace, not just a pause in the fighting.
Starmer is correct on this point. Much commentary is very gloomy about the situation for Ukraine and more generally for Europe’s security in the event that Donald Trump’s apparent plans for Ukraine are implemented. President Trump’s team appears to be treating this as a situation in which Ukraine has been defeated and must accept whatever terms Russia seems inclined to impose. Yet Russia’s situation is precarious: it needs the war to end, and in the medium-term, Europe would be amply able to defend itself from Russia even if the US withdraws from Europe altogether.
Even with its current high level of mobilisation, Russia will not be able to sustain the current intensity of fighting for much longer. It will run short of manpower and equipment, and its economy will encounter severe capacity, fiscal and monetary constraints. Russia has already severely depleted its Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and even at current levels of mobilisation, it is unlikely to be able to replace the ordnance it is using. For example, Russia is currently estimated to be producing about 250,000 shells per month, but firing 300,000 per month. It is increasingly dependent upon foreign assistance, with North Korea supplying about 60% of the artillery and mortar shells it has used in the past three months. Its ability to mobilise weapons production further is limited, as it already faces large labour shortages in the defence production sector as well as more broadly across the economy.
Russia has also struggled with recruiting sufficient additional soldiers – hence its seeking of troops from North Korea. Recruitment appears to be about 36,000 per month, versus a casualty rate of around 40,000-50,000 per month. The available prison population was used up by the end of 2023, and its latest tactic appears to be permitting more sick people to join the army.
The Russian economy has suffered from high inflation and, despite mobilisation, growth has been modest. Problems in funding foreign purchases have been dealt with by running down accumulated reserves and wealth funds, but these are forecast to be exhausted by the autumn of 2025.
Russia needs the war to at least pause, if not end. It has attempted to project an international image that its economy is thriving, but that is largely bluff. If Europe were to replace withdrawn US assistance to Ukraine so the war was maintained at a similar intensity, the attrition of Russia military and economic power would continue and Russia’s military economy might buckle.
Even if it did not buckle, even if it received as war gains all the Ukrainian territories it has taken, and even if US pressure led to the withdrawal of sanctions, Russia would take a number of years to recover and re-arm before it could constitute any threat to Eastern European EU member states. The EU economy and populations are both large multiples of Russia’s. The EU could easily outproduce Russia in the period when Russia was seeking to rearm, should the EU choose to prioritise doing so.
US withdrawal from Europe does not have to leave the EU vulnerable. It is in the EU’s power to prevent that. But a peace deal will set the clock ticking. Much commentary assumes now that Nato Article 5 is a busted flush – the US no longer wants to defend Europe. Indeed, the likely new Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, this weekend suggested that Nato might not even survive until this coming June. Whether things happen that fast or not, the EU can and should defend itself, if it chooses to do so. The next few years will tell us whether it does.
Click here to subscribe to our daily briefing – the best pieces from CapX and across the web.
CapX depends on the generosity of its readers. If you value what we do, please consider making a donation.
