The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence.
These are not the words of US President Donald Trump, nor are they the words of any of his cabinet – they are Obama’s Secretary of Defense. Robert Gates spoke those words to Nato’s ministers in 2011.
President Trump is the American anger made flesh about military burden sharing. Coming into office in January, Trump has made it clear that other Nato states are not pulling their weight to support Ukraine in its war against Russia, particularly since it is occurring in their backyards. Trump has suggested that Nato nations in Europe should have a target for 5% of their GDP to be spent on defence. At a speech at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, he said, ‘We have a thing called the ocean in between us, right? Why are we in for billions and billions of dollars more money than Europe?’
In the past, US pleas for greater European investment in defence focused on fairness, with the US accounting for 68% of NATO spending in 2023, compared to European countries’ 28%. It appears we have been willing to support European defence more than Europe has been willing to.
Today, this is about necessity.
The rise of China to an economic, technological and military superpower has greatly increased the defence burden on the United States.
It is essential and urgent that American allies help shoulder more of the burden of the defence of the West.
The war that Russia has waged against Ukraine has been our first taste of what a global war could look like.
The West has been found wanting.
Inventories of ammunition have been drawn down to near empty. Much of the European military equipment sent to Ukraine has proven to be not fit for purpose, and there is not the manufacturing capacity to replace this quickly. This is why the United States needs Europe to invest urgently in defence production capacity.
The key request from America right now to our European partners is to invest quickly in their military manufacturing capacity. In the first two years of the war on Ukraine, European states focused on giving ageing ammunition and equipment from old warehouses to the Ukrainians. Yet, as the war draws on, most of the ammunition and equipment is gone, and the United States has frozen its aid. Ukraine needs both newer weapons from European countries and financial assistance. And we all need more capacity.
As Russia’s war against Ukraine has gone on, its defence industrial capacity has become intertwined with that of China and Iran. China has not openly supplied Russia with weapons, but it has aided in providing dual-use components such as ‘semiconductors, ball bearings, and machine tools through a complicated network of China- and Hong Kong-based shell companies,’ as well as commercial drones. Furthermore, Iran has also contributed combat drones and ballistic missiles.
In comparison, the West’s defence industrial capacity remains fragmented, and far short of what could be required.
It is a major mistake for Europe to look at Russia’s capacity in isolation, rather than in combination with Chinese and Iranian partners.
With our other allies, especially Japan and South Korea, we are stronger. But only insomuch as we act. Together.
Such defence investments could take many forms across defence supply chains. The pandemic highlighted the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. Four years out, and the West still finds itself short of energetics, legacy electronics and the myriad of small components that keep aircraft flying and ships at sea. The United States, in particular, has an issue of being indirectly dependent on China. In a report from Govini about US defence capability and deterring China, its AI software system for defence acquisition found ‘that between 2005 and 2020, the level of Chinese suppliers in the US supply chains quadrupled’. Govini also found that ‘between 2014 and 2022, US dependence on China for electronics increased by 600%’.
Americans know their supply chain vulnerabilities in key defence technologies. We hope that European governments know theirs. These are a natural start for greater cooperation.
If the US can hone in on the trilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea, we can divest dependence on China and create more reliable supply chains with our partners, ensuring that materials such as critical minerals and semiconductors make it to our defence equipment.
President Trump is pushing aggressively with good reason.
Europe is starting to respond, and President Macron’s speech was a clarion call for European defence. The European Union has proposed a plan to provide $157 billion in loans for defence equipment, pending the members’ ability to coordinate the funds.
We have already squandered too much time. We must all move purposefully and directly.
As we rise to the challenge together, we should remember Abraham Lincoln’s plea to his fellow Americans on the eve of the Civil War, a plea that sadly today is relevant to the transatlantic relationship:
We are not enemies but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.
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