Most countries in the world illustrate the rule that growth is rarely favoured in places with authoritarian governments. China is one of a few exceptions: a country that has a rapidly growing economy, which at the same time is ruled by a virtually all-powerful dictator. The country is known for its combination of strong government control and economic deregulation. This has brought about a social situation in China rather unlike most modern societies. However, historically, this situation is very similar to the social hierarchy which existed in France right before the revolution in the 18th century. It is very possible that future changes in the social and political structure of China can be predicted by looking at the example of France’s Ancien Regime (Old Regime).
Chinese society is divided in distinct socioeconomic groups. The vast majority of the Chinese population lives in poverty. Education for them is lacking, and as a result, the levels of illiteracy are still high. A small proportion of the population, however, is wealthy, cultured and urban: the middle class. Those people are typically entrepreneurs and investors, by whom the first class is employed, and who profited from China’s conversion to the liberal economy and open trade after the death of Mao led by Deng Xiaoping. The cheapness of labour is the main reason why the disparity of wealth between these two groups is more important there than in most other countries. Yet no-one from either class has much power over the governance of the country. This responsibility is in the hands of even smaller group members of the ruling single party, with the president of China at the very top.
This can be compared to the analogous social orders of France in the feudal age. Instead of a ruling party, France was governed by the nobility, the highest of which was the court at Versailles, with the king at its head. What we now call the middle class was then called the “bourgeoisie”, and achieved their fortune through similar means, especially commerce, and having the same relation of employment with the majority of the population. Instead of workers, most of the population was mostly made up of peasants, but essentially their social role was about the same – as employees of the businesses held by members of the bourgeoisie – and illiteracy was also the norm. The bourgeoisie and the other commoners, who made up around ninety percent of the population, were known as the “third-estate”, the other two estates being the nobility and the clergy. The clergy did not have to follow any of the rules to which the third-estate was subjected, especially on the matter of taxes, from which the nobles and the church were exempt. Many historians believe that the French revolution was a way for the bourgeoisie to gain political power and abolish the system “privileges” which forced them to pay taxes, rather than the nobles. The constitution of the regime following the 1789 revolution (a constitutional monarchy) and the subsequent first republic both only allowed voting by those who owned property and paid a given amount of tax. These “active citizens”, as they were known as under that constitution, were only a small minority of the population previously bound by the rules set by the king and paying him taxes.
The ruling party in China acts like an absolute regime, the constitution of China presents it as a democratic dictatorship. To make sense of this kind of semantic aberration, one has to look at the situation of opposition parties, and indeed, running against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is practically impossible. In 2008, the CCP received one hundred percent of the seats and in 2013, it conceded 830 of the 2987 seats to the United Front, a coalition headed by the CCP itself.
The conflict between the industrial middle class and the ruling party over the issue of political influence can be seen quite clearly as the government protects itself form the influence of wealthy individuals in the various cases of corruption and the severity with which it punishes those convicted of bribery, not hesitating to send them in jail for life or even have them executed.
The current Chinese middle class is like that of the French in the 18th century in that they draw their fortune form similar economic systems and thus have similar interests. The Chinese middle class profited from the era of Deng in the same way that French bourgeois usually found their wealth also through commerce and industry.
The analogy is also supported by the apparent relation that exists between wealth and education in China. According to the New York Times, the proportion of well-educated young people is decreasing along with the increasingly uneven distribution of wealth. Because of that, it is likely that any change in the political dynamic or system would be led by the relatively small middle class, in the same way that the French revolution, even though it included a popular uprising, was largely initiated and conducted by an economic and intellectual elite. The same applies to China for several reasons.
Firstly, it is generally the members of the middle that occupy positions of influence in the government and the economy and so would be in a position cause a stir. Secondly, as China has become more of a market system, money has naturally come to play a bigger role in its public affairs, both lawfully and not, placing the middle class in a more favourable position by its very nature.
Lastly, it is a general rule that people in severe poverty, as is the case of many in China, tend to be less concerned with politics, as was said by Maximilien de Robespierre, who was a major player in the French revolution: “most of our fellow citizens are reduced by poverty to a supreme level of humbling whereby they are too preoccupied with surviving to think about the causes of their misery and about the rights that nature has given them”. So it less conceivable that changes would be prompted by members of the working class rather than the wealthier members of society. This has been observed previously. The Tiananmen protests in 1989 were conducted by students, and the more recent protests, occur in big cities like Shanghai or this year in Hong-Kong.
Of course, there would have to be a good reason for some members of the middle class to believe it would be better for them to run the country instead of the current government. Such reasons potentially exist. For one thing, the middle class can attribute its wealth to the existing system of economic deregulation established by law. Therefore, it is in the interest of those who benefit from it to ensure the government maintain that system.
Secondly, there are currently restriction on the movement of capital which are detrimental to rich entrepreneurs. While capitals can flow rather easily into China, Chinese currency is not easily convertible to allow capitals to leave the country, thus limiting the scope of opportunity for those who built their wealth in China. Changing such restrictions could be another reason why rich industrials in China would want to exercise more political power. It seems the Chinese government has taken note of this as it has announced an easing of these particular regulations.
The CCP’s legitimacy is ultimately rather weak since it was neither elected nor can it claim any form of “divine” right like some monarchs still do. Right now it has shown itself effective in promoting China’s development but should people’s satisfaction with the regime drop, it would lose its credibility and would be vulnerable. If so, it is the middle class who would lead the charge.
