Though few at Nato would admit it, in his first four years as US President, Donald Trump had more impact on the security alliance than his immediate predecessors, Obama and Bush, put together. To understand the future Trump-Nato relationship, one should look to the past.
The most obvious Nato success of the first Trump administration was to get European members of Nato to begin the long process of increasing expenditures to meet the Nato minimum goal of spending 2% of GDP on defence. This goal in some form or another had existed since 1999. All Nato members had repeatedly affirmed it. The Bush and Obama administrations had even threatened harsh consequences for their allies in failing to meet it. Only Trump succeeded in getting the Europeans to take the goal seriously. When Trump came to power, only four countries in Nato Europe met the 2% guideline. Now it is 23, out of 32 allies. Of course, Putin’s aggression towards Ukraine played a major part. But Trump’s pressure was decisive. In effect, he got his way by coercion, virtually threatening US withdrawal from Nato should the Europeans continue to ignore the 2% guideline that they had repeatedly affirmed.
Trump’s impact was wider and deeper than getting Europeans to spend more on defence. In 2019, at a Nato Summit in London, he pressurised a reluctant alliance to admit for the first time that China could be a challenge ‘that we need to address together as an Alliance’, according to the London declaration. The language was modest, and seemingly obvious and innocuous. Its significance was great. At Trump’s insistence, the Europeans’ hitherto firm resistance to bringing China into Nato’s ambit of concern was broken.
Other Trump initiatives in his first term were equally consequential. He drove through a deal with the Taliban in February 2020 which led, over a year later, to Nato’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden bears the responsibility for the chaos of Nato’s exit in August 2021, but Trump deserves the credit (or blame) for initiating a process which unstuck Nato from the longest and most problematic engagement in its history.
In negotiating with the Taliban, Trump trusted his instinct, not his allies. He ignored European sensibilities about negotiating with enemies, misogynists and terrorists. The Taliban deal was negotiated over the heads of Nato allies, as a US deal – even though the Nato presence in Afghanistan was a collective effort, subject to collective consultation and decision making by Nato as a whole.
Perhaps his greatest impact on Nato was that he infused the organisation, for the first time in its history, with a sense of its own mortality. He objected to European dependence on the United States for defence against Russia, while, at the same time, the Europeans skimped on defence and depended on Russia for cheap energy. The Trump trauma led Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Ursula Von der Leyen and others to intensify their efforts to escape the overbearing pressures of US leadership. They redoubled efforts to construct a European defence capacity and to develop European strategic autonomy through the EU. Unfortunately for the EU, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed how dependent Europe has become on US strategic power.
The return of Trump fills the Alliance with dread. The future of Ukraine is at stake from his belief that he can make peace by negotiating with Putin, and presumably intimidating Zelensky. To some extent, and with the connivance of the Biden administration, Nato has tried to Trump-proof its Ukrainian policy. In July 2024, it established a new Nato military command (Nato Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine – NSATU), with 700 personnel, explicitly for the purpose of motivating and coordinating equipment supply and training for the Ukrainian armed forces. If Trump blocks US support, Nato has the mechanisms to continue aid with European allies’ contributions. But Nato’s Trump-proofing will probably be in vain. If US aid to Ukraine ends, it will break Ukraine’s resolve to continue the fight, however much the Europeans are determined to continue their support to Ukraine through Nato and the EU.
In short, Trump rejects the collectivist ties that bind the US to Europe through Nato. He will persist in his quest to make the Europeans bear the whole burden of their own defence. In this regard, Macron’s phone call to Trump, the first European leader to congratulate him on his win, was significant. Macron undoubtedly emphasised that the time for European defence responsibility has at long last come. For Trump, the Macron line is seductive. He will take Macron at his word. In his second term, even more aggressively and abrasively than before, President Trump will insist that Europe can and must defend itself. He believes in US leadership by coercion. Nato is in for a very bumpy ride.
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