Donald Trump’s remarkable and decisive second election victory shows that the realignment of US politics that he brought about eight years ago has not gone away but has become even more entrenched. The Democrats are clearly on the wrong end of it.
Trump and the Republicans gained among every social group and income bracket – apart from the over-65s, the rich, and college-educated women. There were also significant gains in more than 80% of the counties now declared, in every region of the US, with the biggest gains in several urban counties in places such as Pennsylvania. All of this contributed to his becoming only the second Republican candidate in 34 years to win the popular vote. Most striking were his gains among minority men – he got the support of 46% of Hispanic men and 24% of African American men. All this leaves the Democrats in a much worse place than 2016, with nowhere to hide.
What though about the rest of the world? There are two aspects to this. The first is Trump’s impact on electoral politics outside the United States, particularly in Europe. The other is what his return might portend for international relations and the beleaguered international system. The first is the most apparently simple, but in reality more complex.
The obvious conclusion is that Trump’s victory will encourage and embolden a certain kind of right-wing politics – the kind normally described as ‘right populist’ or ‘far right’. The flip side of this is that the Republicans’ success, not only in Trump winning, but in winning both houses of Congress, will not be welcome to the mainstream Right nor their more radical counterparts – for reasons that will become clear. What Trump has done over the last eight years is transform the Republican Party. It is no longer the party of Reagan, who is now remembered fondly but is no longer an ideological compass. It is also no longer the party of neoconservatism and its foreign policy agenda, as Dick Cheney’s endorsement of Kamala Harris demonstrated.
The Republicans are now the party of economic nationalism, immigration restrictionism, an active role for government in economic policy and a citizenship-based welfare system. Many right-wing parties in Europe, including some of those described as ‘populist right’, remain committed to a combination of nationalism on questions of identity and migration with support for free markets and limits on the role of government. This combination is going to be increasingly hard to sustain, not least because of the contradiction between nationalism and the global nature of contemporary capitalism. Several populist parties, such as Vox in Spain and the Progress Party in Norway, are seeing an increasing movement towards the ‘national conservative’ position and away from what we may call ‘libertarianism in one country’. The example and influence of a united US government is going to encourage this movement, already complete in places such as France and Poland.
In international relations, the election result is a clear repudiation by Republican voters and politicians of the globalist foreign policy of the neoconservatives – who almost all endorsed Kamala Harris. We will see a move to an ‘America First’ unilateralism. This means that under Trump, the US will move away from the notion that it is a ‘proposition nation’ with a mission to reshape the world towards liberal democracy, social liberalism and free markets. Instead, there will be a recognition of the reality of a multi-polar world. This raises difficult questions, and for Europeans in particular: over their defence capabilities, the Ukraine war and the Middle East. Neither Left nor Right has thought about this seriously.
Finally, what of classical liberals? They will welcome the defeat of a radical woke agenda, but be dismayed by the rest. Trump’s protectionism, economic nationalism and attempts to control migration (which inevitably means domestic authoritarianism) are contrary to their instincts. What is needed for them is serious thinking about what kind of international order they want to see, and the development and articulation of positive and substantive arguments for things like a cosmopolitan global economy and society. These need to go beyond arguments about economics to a fuller vision of individual and collective flourishing and what is needed to sustain it in the world. What they must not do at any cost is tie themselves to the sinking ship of technocratic liberal governance, with its denial of actual political debate and assertion of a cultural agenda that few share and which is enforced by curtailing free speech. However, they must also realise that the alliance with conservatives that marked the cold war era is over. This is a lonely position, but potentially invigorating.
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