What was Liz Truss’ biggest mistake as Prime Minister? Attention has, not unreasonably, tended to focus on the mini-Budget which fractured the Conservative parliamentary party, spooked the markets, forced out the Chancellor and ultimately precipitated her resignation. But the mini-Budget was arguably the product of an earlier poor decision: forming a Cabinet which excluded dissenters.
Of Truss’ Cabinet of 23, 18 had backed her in the summer 2022 leadership election. The other five had been undeclared. And so as Britain’s new Prime Minister considered how to shake up the British state, she was largely surrounded by fellow travellers, seemingly unwilling to stand up to her and certainly not representative of the breadth of views (and talent) held by Conservative MPs. Mistakes inevitably followed – and when they did, jilted MPs on the backbenches were in an unforgiving mood.
The stakes are a lot lower for the new Conservative leader. The burdens of government have rarely appeared so far away, with their task limited to shepherding the rump of Conservative MPs on the opposition benches. But the risks and pitfalls of forming the wrong top team remain. So, what lessons can the new leader learn from the Tory party’s past?
The first is to bring the leadership candidates together. In a parliamentary party of just 121 MPs, 26 of whom were elected for the first time in July, the new leader will not be spoilt for choice when forming their front bench. They will need to draw upon experienced people with a following in the party, and there are few better places to look than their fellow crop of aspiring leaders.
David Cameron, the last Conservative leader to take the party from opposition into government, found room for both David Davis and Liam Fox in his top team after winning the 2005 leadership contest. He even persuaded Ken Clarke, whose previous failed bids for the leadership had resulted in him returning to the backbenches, to join his team – although that did take a few years. As Cameron knew, there is always a risk that defeated candidates are not team players, but there are even greater risks in keeping them out of the team altogether.
The next leader should be similarly generous in making an offer to the five defeated leadership candidates. And even if they think their offer will be declined, they would still be wise to make it. After dislodging him from the top spot in 1975, Margaret Thatcher went to Edward Heath’s home, with the press in tow, to offer him a role. He didn’t want it, and she didn’t want him to accept it, but she knew the value of being seen to offer it. Thatcher appeared magnanimous in victory; Heath, who still harboured leadership ambitions, looked petulant. It set the tone for the years to come.
Bringing the leadership candidates together will also help the leader create a Shadow Cabinet that represents the spectrum of Conservative opinion. Here, the new leader can learn from one of Thatcher’s early mistakes. When asked by the press in 1975 about a possible purge of the Heathites, Thatcher hit back: ‘Good heavens, no!’ She would, she pledged, create a united team.
Thatcher was mostly true to her word, but she did indulge in a mini cull, principally sacking Heath’s former leadership campaign manager Peter Walker. While their views often differed, Walker was not only talented but intellectually curious about how the Conservatives should meet the challenges facing the country. On the backbenches, he focused his energies on making speeches and writing a book critical of where Thatcher was taking the Tories. Thatcher lost out on his insights; worse, she made an enemy – needlessly.
In 1979, Thatcher realised her mistake and, when forming her actual Cabinet, invited Walker back in from the cold. Four years after sacking him, she judged that Walker now gave her credibility with ‘one nation’ Tories and helped her claim that her Cabinet represented ‘every strand of Conservative opinion’. If they are to lead a united party, the Tories’ new leader will hope to make similar boasts, but will only be able to credibly do so if their actions match their rhetoric.
Thatcher was lucky that she didn’t need to have the Tory A-Team on her front bench to get back into government. The same may not be true for the new leader, for whom the aftermath of 1997, until July the Tory’s worst electoral mullering in the party’s long history, serves as a warning. When William Hague triumphed over Ken Clarke, Clarke declined to serve in the Shadow Cabinet. Along with Michael Heseltine, one of the few remaining Tory big beasts, he went to the backbenches. Theirs was talent and experience that the Conservative opposition could not do without – and it showed.
Throughout the Parliament, Hague’s problems got worse. By 1999, his original picks to shadow the three great offices of state had all departed. Up against Blair and Brown, the Conservatives appeared to be fielding their B-team. It was little surprise that the party failed to recover at the next election. Repeating that mistake would be disastrous for a Tory party fighting for survival, with threats on its left and right flank.
In opposition, the Conservatives must learn from the mistakes of recent years. A good start would be bringing together a top team that represents the talent and the breadth of opinion in the Conservative Party. It’s easy to say, difficult to do. But if the party is to move forward united, and the new leader is to survive in their role, it will be essential.
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